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The impacts of stock characteristics and regulatory change on mutual fund herding in Taiwan  
 
Abstract 
This paper analyzes the trading activity of Taiwanese open-end equity mutual fund 
herding behaviour over the period of 1996 to 2008. We find evidence of both directional 
and directionless herding. We also find that sell-side fund herding leads to price 
stabilization whereas buy side herding results in, prices adjusting slowly. We find that 
the abolition of Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) has reduced directionless 
and sell side herding but has had no effect on buy side herding  
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The impacts of stock characteristics and regulatory change on mutual fund herding in 
Taiwan 
1 Introduction 
Herding behaviour may be divided into two categories: intentional herding and unintentional 
herding. Intentional herding behaviour occurs when investors follow their peers’ actions. The 
theory of information cascade is based on the assumption of information asymmetry among 
investors. Therefore, if investors herd intentionally, they will follow other investors because 
they think that the other investors have private information, regardless of its accuracy 
(Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003) 
In contrast, unintentional herding behaviour occurs when investors follow fundamental 
stock characteristics such as size, book-to-market ratio, liquidity, and analyst coverage all affect 
herding behaviour ( Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003; Jiang, 2010). Information-based unintentional 
herding behaviour may come from momentum trading strategies as fund managers 
unintentionally follow the trading activities of other fund managers (Barberies and Shleifer, 
2003). Further, the widow-dressing effect theory may explain herding behaviour (Lakonishok 
et al., 1991; Meier and Schaumburg, 2004; Sias, 2006; Elton et al., 2010), as fund managers 
generally sell loser stocks and use past winners to improve his or her performance prior to the 
performance report dates.  
Scharfstein and Stein (1990) contend that herding behaviour will destabilize stock prices 
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because herding will create either positive excess demand (net buying) or negative excess 
demand (net selling) for one particular stock and cause irrational fluctuations in prices. 
However, the stock will eventually return to its intrinsic value. Therefore, the process actually 
causes greater price volatility. However, Walter and Weber (2006) argue that the momentum 
trading strategy will stabilize stock prices due to the market’s inefficient reaction to new 
information. They therefore argue that herding could correct this phenomenon. Chang (2010) 
found that herding could potentially destabilize stock prices in Taiwan. 
This paper analyses the importance of herding behaviour in Taiwanese mutual funds. Taiwan’s 
capital markets are important for a number of reasons. Taiwan’s mutual fund industry has 
grown almost tenfold over the past two decades. There are 526 funds of which 311 are open-
end equity funds with a total market value of around US$22.34 billion as reported by Taiwan 
Securities Investment Trust and Consulting Association (SITCA) in March 2010. Ramos (2009) 
shows that in 2005, the Taiwanese mutual fund market was the 12th largest in the world in 
terms of industry size. It was the third largest in the Asian countries behind Japan and Korea. 
In addition, the open-end mutual fund market has experienced significant growth in recent 
years. For example, the number of funds increased by 267% over the period 1996-2008 and 
the number of stocks being traded rose by over 100%. The expansion of the mutual fund 
industry therefore makes it important to assess the way in which it operates. 
This paper makes a number of contributions to the herding literature. First, the period 
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under analysis covers a change in the regulatory regime of Taiwanese financial markets. In the 
early 1990’s the Taiwanese government adopted a more flexible attitude to foreign investors 
by permitting Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) to invest directly in Taiwan’s 
stock market. In 2003 the Taiwanese government decided to further expand the degree of 
foreign investment by relaxing limitations on foreign investors by abolishing the QFII system. 
Between 2002, (pre-QFII abolition) and 2006 total trading volume on the TAIFEX has 
increased nearly 140 percent suggesting that the abolition of the QFII regulation has achieved 
its goal of increasing the level of foreign participation in the Taiwan financial markets.  
Second, much of the literature on institutional herding literature has focused primarily on 
the US, Lakonishok et al. (1992), Wermers (1999), and Griffin et al. (2003). Other markets that 
have shown herding characteristics include South Korea, Choe et al. (1999); Poland, 
Voronkova and Bohl (2005); Germany, Walter and Weber (2006); and the UK, Wylie (2005). 
The rapidly growing Taiwanese economy with its increasingly important mutual fund sector 
has received relatively little attention. Hung et al. (2010) find that mutual funds tend to follow 
their own trades rather than follow those of other funds. This paper uses the Lakonishok et al. 
(1992) and Wermers (1999) methodologies to analyse herding within a specific time period.  
The main results of the paper are as follows. First, we find strong evidence of herding 
activity and momentum trading by mutual fund managers in Taiwan. Second, we find buy-side 
herding behaviour seems to destabilise stock prices. Third, consistent with the information 
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contained in a firm’s fundamental characteristics, our results show a stronger tendency in 
directional herding behaviour with a higher level of buy-side (sell-side) herding in growth 
(value) stocks. We also find that fund characteristics influence the extent of herding. Thus buy 
side herding is also affected by the extent of abnormal stock returns, and fund characteristics 
such as the size of the fund and the age of the fund. Sell side herding is affected by the size of 
the company, its book to market ratio, stock liquidity, abnormal returns as well as fund size and 
fund fees. Fourth, we find that the abolition of QFII regulations have not affected the extent of 
buy side herding but that both directionless and sell side herding are significantly lower in the 
post-QFII period.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section II explains the data and 
presents empirical results on herding measures sorted by the firms’ characteristics; section III 
discusses herding and stock return patterns; and section IV discusses the regression results and 
Section V presents the conclusions.  
II Data and Methodology 
Data 
We use data provided by the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) from January 1996 to December 
2008. The TEJ reports mutual fund equity holdings data on a quarterly basis and price 
information on a monthly basis. To avoid selection bias, all our samples are required to have a 
minimum of 12 month returns history during the observation period. This gives a sample of 
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200 open-end equity mutual funds and 1,095 stocks.  
Herding measures 
We initially use the herding measure proposed by Lakonishok et al. (LSV, 1992). The herding 
measure for stock i during stock-quarter i,t, HMi,t, is that mutual funds buy or sell stock i during 
t. and it is defined as follows: 
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HMi,t: directionless herding measure for stock i in period t. 
Pi,t : is the proportion of all mutual funds trading in stock-quarter i, t that are buyers 
.Pt : is the proportion of all stock trades by funds that are purchasers during quarter 
t.  
AFi,t : is the adjustment factor and captures the random variation of Pi,t around its 
proportion of buyers under the assumption that trades follow a binomial 
distribution with ,i tB  and ,i tS  as possible outcomes.. 
     , ,,
,
,
,
0 , ,
1i t i t
i t
i t
N
B N Bi t N
i t t B t t
B i t i t
B
AF P C P P
B S


               
Bi,t(Si,t): the number of funds that buy (sell) the stock i during period t. 
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The original herding measure of LSV is directionless which means it only measures the 
herding activities without considering whether it comes from the buy or sell side. Wermers 
(1999) proposes a directional herding measure to correct this disadvantage. Accordingly, our 
study incorporates Wermers’ (1999) herding measure and investigates directional herding 
behaviour, such as buy-side herding measure (BHM) and sell-side measure (SHM). The 
directional herding measures are defined as follows: 
BHMi,t = HMi,t | pi,t > pt , Buy-side herding measure.   (2) 
SHMi,t = HMi,t | pi,t < pt, Sell-side herding measure.   (3) 
Insert Table 1 
Table 1 reports fund managers’ buy and sell decisions by year, as well as looking at the 
QFII and post-QFII periods. The number of fund increases throughout the period from 52 to 
191. The percentage of buy decisions fell in the post regulatory change period from 51% to 
49%. At the same time, the percentage of sell decisions rose from 49% to 51%. Over the whole 
period, buys and sells each accounted for 50% of the trades. 
Buy and sell side herding  
Insert Table 2 
Table 2 presents the directionless LSV herding measure (HM), directional buy-side 
herding (BHM) and sell-side herding (SHM) for each year and all stock-quarters. It shows the 
herding statistics by the number of funds trading a particular stock. All herding measures are 
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significantly greater that zero at the 1% level. For all stock-quarters, the directionless HM is 
8.43% for stocks traded by at least one fund. This means that, given the alternative hypothesis 
of zero herding, that is, a 50:50 buy-sell split, 58.4% of mutual funds change their trades to one 
side of the market and 41.6% change to the other side.  
Table 2 also shows, for all stock-periods and for all the numbers of funds trading a stock, 
the directional BHM is greater than the SHM. This outcome is consistent with Brown et al. 
(2007) who argue that buy-herding may be greater than sell-herding due to the short sell 
limitation in the mutual fund industry  
Our findings are consistent with the studies of other less mature capital markets. Our 
overall directionless HM is 8.43% compared with 7.2% found by Choe et al. (1999) for the 
Korean market, and 11.38% by Lobao and Serra (2002) for the Portuguese market,  
Our overall HM numbers are much higher than the mature market herding studies, for 
example 2.7% by Lakonishok et al. (1992) with a minimum of one fund traded, and 3.4% by 
Wermers (1999) for the U.S. market, 2.6% by Wylie (2005) for the U.K. market, and 5.59% by 
Walter and Weber (2006) for the German market with a minimum of 5 funds traded a given 
stock for that period.  
One explanation for this is the information cascade herding theory. It proposes that there 
is less information efficiency in a less mature capital market, which is consistent with the higher 
degree of herding behaviour in Taiwan. Another possible explanation may be that there are 
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more regulatory restrictions in the Taiwanese mutual fund industry than in mature markets.  
Similar to previous studies (Lakonishok et al., 1992; Wermers, 1999; Wylie, 2005; Walter 
and Weber, 2006), we also find the probability of herding rises with the number of fund 
managers trading that particular stock increases. Moreover, Wermers (1999) points out that if 
only a small number of managers trade in the same direction, it should not be classified as a 
herd. Thus, as a robustness test, we impose a number of higher hurdles with up to twenty five 
funds trading a given stock. We then compute new herding statistics and find an increase in 
herding as the number of funds increases. These figures are consistent with our initial findings. 
In our analysis we impose a requirement that at least 5 fund managers trade a given stock on 
stock-periods when calculating the herding measure.  
III Empirical Results 
Herding by stock characteristics 
Fama and French (1992) have outlined the importance of market premium, size premium and 
book-to-market premium. Amihud (2002) points out the positive relationship between stock 
returns and illiquidity. We therefore examine the levels of herding by separating stocks by 
characteristics, such as size, book-to-market ratio, illiquidity factor, liquidity factor, and stock 
returns. We also look at whether this occurs more often on the buy-side or sell-side of 
Taiwanese mutual fund trading.  
Stock characteristics consist of SIZE, the natural log of the market value of equity at time 
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t. Lakonishok et al. (1992) and Froot et al. (1992) argue that herding is more likely for larger 
stocks because information is more likely to be more widely available. In addition, Wermers 
(1999) and Hung et al. (2010) find herding amongst smaller stocks. BM is the book to market 
ratio defined as book to market value of the equity at time t Wermers (1999) and Hung (2010) 
report that funds sell overvalued shares and buy undervalued shares. We use two measures of 
information uncertainty. First, ILLIQUIDITY is defined as the absolute value of returns scaled 
by dollar volume, Amihud (2002) and second, STURN which is the log of the average share 
turnover during the previous three months. Sias (2004) argues that fund managers will be 
reluctant to trade in stocks that have lower liquidity or greater information uncertainty. A 
number of studies have found that funds buy when stock performance has been good and sell 
when it has been bad, Lakonishok et al. (1992), Grinblatt et al. (1995) and Wermers (1999). 
We include RET2-3 as a measure of performance. It is defined as the cumulative abnormal 
returns over the second and third months prior to the current month.   
Insert Table 3 
Table 3 reports mean herding measures for each of the above stock characteristics. Panel 
A shows the herding measures sorted by stock size (S). We spilt size into three groups, S1, S2 
and S3 which refer to the 30, 40, 30 percentiles respectively by ranking, where S1 stands for 
the smallest sized stocks and S3 represents the largest sized stocks. For all three types of 
herding measure, we find that the herding behaviours are statistically significant and different 
 12
from zero across all size groups. However, the difference between small and large stocks is not 
significant for any of the types of herding measure. This result is consistent with Walter and 
Weber (2006) who report that stock size does not matter in herding in German mutual funds.  
In Panel B we sort stocks into three book-to-market ratio (BM) groups, where BM3 
contains highest 30% BM stocks, BM1 contains lowest 30% BM stocks, and BM 2 contains 
middle 40% BM stocks. Panel B shows HM measures are significantly different from zero 
across all BM groups and BM3 stocks have significantly higher herding than BM1 stocks at 
the 5% level. For buy-side herding, we find that herding decreases as BM increases with, the 
difference between BM3 and BM1 being significant at 5%. However, the sell-side herding 
increases as BM increases with the difference between BM1 and BM3 significant at 1%. We 
therefore find buy-side fund managers herding behaviour is concentrated more on growth 
stocks whereas mutual fund managers are more likely to exhibit sell-side herding behaviour in 
value stocks.  
Panel C sorts stocks by the illiquid proxy where ILLIQ1 (ILLIQ3) contains the lowest 
(highest) 30% stocks. All illiquidity measures are significantly different from zero. However, 
there are no differences between the most and least illiquid stocks for total and buy herding 
measures In contrast we find that sell side herding is higher in low illiquidity stocks than in 
high illiquidity stocks. Consequently, the overall herding measure, HM, has a higher value in 
low illiquid stocks than in high illiquid stocks.  
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Panel D displays mean values of the herding measures sort by the second liquidity proxy 
STURN where STURN1 (STURN3) contains the lowest (highest) 30% of stocks by liquidity. 
The results show that liquidity does exercise some influence on the behaviour in herding among 
Taiwan’s mutual fund managers. The highest turnover ratio subgroup, STURN3, has the 
highest herding measure for both directional and directionless herding. The difference between 
STURN3 and STURN1 is significant for all three herding measures at the 1% level. The results 
suggest that liquidity is an important factor in determining the herding behaviour of mutual 
fund managers in Taiwan, and that fund managers prefer to deal in stocks with higher liquidity. 
Table 3 Panel E reports the mean herding measure by returns during each three-month 
formation period, which RET1 represents the lowest 30% of formation period returns and 
RET3 for the highest 30% of formation period returns. All three herding measures show 
significant and positive returns for all return levels. The directionless HM shows that the 
difference between the highest and lowest returns is not statistically significant. However, in 
the directional herding measures, both BHM and SHM produce significantly different results. 
The highest returns produce significantly higher buy-side herding whereas with sell side 
herding, the lowest returns produce the highest herding figure. Our findings therefore indicate 
that Taiwanese mutual fund managers pursue momentum strategies. The results also offer 
evidence that there is window dressing, given that Taiwanese fund managers engage in a 
momentum trading strategy, Grinblatt et al. (1995) and Walter and Weber (2006),. 
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Regulatory change and the impact on the prior and post returns of institutional herding 
portfolios 
Scharfstein and Stein (1990) contend that herding behaviour will destabilize stock prices 
because it will push stock prices above their intrinsic value during the formation period. 
Therefore after the formation period, stock prices will return to their intrinsic values and a 
negative return will occur. Grinblatt et al. (1995) point out fund managers will put more weight 
on recent stock performance. Wermers (1999) and Sias (2004) also observe the return 
continuation patterns from herding behaviour.  
Following these arguments, we analyse the prior and post returns of mutual fund herding 
portfolios in Table 4. P1 (P4) stands for the intense buy (sell) herding portfolio and P2 (P3) 
light buy (sell) portfolio. For each portfolio we calculate equally weighted buy-and-hold returns 
of three quarters prior to the formation period, during the three month formation period and for 
the subsequent four quarters.  
Panel A covers the whole period, 1996-2008. Panel B reports results for 1996-2002 and 
Panel C presents results for 2004-2008. We use 2003 as a break period because the Taiwanese 
government abolished the QFII system of regulation in October 2003. Panel D compares the 
herding returns in the QFII and post QFII periods. With the presence of institutional money 
one would expect that higher quality information about specific securities will be made more 
readily available to the capital markets via security analysis. Therefore, if herding returns are 
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lower, and statistically significant post QFII, this will suggest that the regulatory changes will 
have increased the efficiency of the market,   
Insert Table 4 
The results in Table 4, Panel A offer some support for the stock price destabilization 
hypothesis which argues that the buy-herding behaviour will cause a positive return during the 
formation period whereas sell-herding behaviour will produce a negative return for the same 
period. However, the price destabilising theory argues that, if prices return to their intrinsic 
level in the post formation period, we would expect buy side returns to be negative and sell 
side returns to be positive.  
The post formation sell-herding return patterns support the stabilization of stock returns 
argument because prices do not rise in the post formation period during which returns are 
positive, but not significantly different from zero in all of the four post formation periods. This 
implies that, on the sell side, fund herding leads to price stabilisation and that prices adjust 
quickly, In contrast, we find significant positive returns post buy-side herding for Q2, Q3 and 
Q4. This suggests that, on the buy-side, new information is slowly impounded in prices as they 
continue to adjust even post herding.  
Table 4 Panel B shows that in the period during which QFII was in force, there were 
significant, positive gains made intense buy, light buy and intense sell portfolios. It also shows 
that in the post formation period, there is no evidence of price destabilisation in either the buy 
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or sell side. As Panel C shows, in the post QFII period, 2004 to 2008, herding is related to 
future returns only for light buy stocks in Q3 and Q4. Therefore, our general results shown in 
Panel A, that new buy-side information is more slowly impounded into prices, are driven 
mainly by the result obtained during the period before the 2003 market reform.  
Panel D compares the herding statistics across the two time periods. Thus, for example, 
we compare the intense buy returns for the QFII period, 1996-2002, with the post-QFII period, 
2004-2008. We find that intense buy side herding returns were lower after the market reforms, 
7.73% rather than 10.69%, with the difference being significant at the 1% level. There is also 
a significant fall in the light buy side herding returns post-QFII. Light sell side is also 
significantly lower but there is no significant difference in the intense sell side figure. Overall, 
our results suggest that the abolition of QFII in Taiwan has made the market more efficient by 
reducing the extent of herding returns amongst mutual funds. 
Insert Table 5 
Table 5 reports summary statistics of the variables used in the regression analysis. Panel 
A includes summary statistics for fund characteristics. The average total net assets value 
(TNAV) of all funds in the sample is NT$2081.42 millions. The average fee charged is 1.45% 
of the net asset value. The average age of the fund is 7.19 years. Panel B provides summary 
statistics on stocks characteristics in the sample across the testing period. The average market 
capitalization is NT$45757.64 millions and the average trading volume is 3.15 millions. We 
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also find the average book-to-market ratio is 0.52 which indicates that the Taiwan stock market 
contains more growth stocks than value stocks. Moreover, Panel B also reports that the average 
turnover is 29%, ILLIQ is 0.05, STURN is 3 and the cumulative return over the second through 
the third months prior to the current month (RET2_3) is 3%. Panel C shows that the average 
fund managers buy (11.61) and sell (11.54) decisions are very similar.  
 
Insert Table 6 
 
Table 6 reports mean comparison tests for each variable so that we can track differences 
before and after the regulatory change. Panel A reports the results for fund characteristics. It 
shows the average TNAV decreased significantly from 2488.09 million in 1996-2003 to 
1838.18 millions in 2004-2008. The average fee charges fell but the reduction is not significant. 
Panel A also shows the average fund age is significantly older in 2004-2008 period than in 
1996-2003 period. This suggests that funds with longer history may have positive network 
externalities. 
 Panel B shows a significant increase in market value and book to market but a significant 
fall in share turnover. There are no differences in the mean values of the other stock 
characteristics. Panel C shows that there were significant increases in the number of buy and 
sell decisions of fund managers post QFII. This is not unexpected as the number of funds 
increased throughout the period. Moreover, Panel C also shows that during QFII deregulation, 
there are more buy decision than sell decision. After QFII abolition, there are more sell 
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decisions than buy decisions. 
IV Regression Analysis  
In this section we develop the analysis by analysing the factors determining mutual fund 
herding in Taiwan. We run fixed effects regressions using three dependent variables, the 
directionless herding measure and the buy, and sell, herding measures. Comparing the 
directionless herding results with those for buy and sell herding will show the importance of 
differentiating between the two types of herding. We employ three sets of independent variables: 
stock characteristics, fund characteristics and the abolition of the QFII regulation in 2003. We 
use clustered standard errors given that standard errors are likely to be clustered at the stock 
level. 
This gives a general regression model of: 
);;( ,,, ttititi QFIIicsaracteristMeanfundchcteristicsStockCharafHM    (1) 
);;( ,,, ttititi QFIIicsaracteristMeanfundchcteristicsStockCharafBHM     (2) 
);;( ,,, ttititi QFIIicsaracteristMeanfundchcteristicsStockCharafSHM    (3) 
Stock characteristics consist of SIZE, BM, STURN, ILLIQ and RET2-3 as defined earlier. 
We also include a number of variables that control for fund characteristics. Large funds are 
likely to have more specialised resources and better information than small funds. We therefore 
expect large funds to exhibit lower levels of herding. Fund size, TNAV, is the log of a fund’s 
total net asset value at time t. Fee income could be a measure of the incentives faced by a fund. 
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If fee income is high, there will be an incentive to devote resources to the analysis of the market. 
We would therefore expect less herding the higher the fees. FEES is defined as the amount the 
fund manager charges at time t. The number of years a fund has been trading may also influence 
the extent of herding. Younger funds are more likely to follow the buy-sell strategies of older, 
better known funds because younger funds may be more risk averse and so are more likely to 
herd. As the fund gets older, the pressure to herd will become less. We measure AGE by the 
number of years a fund has been trading in time t. 
We include a time dummy, QFII, which takes a value 1 post 2003 and 0 pre-2003. 2003 
was the year the QFII regulation changed to allow greater openness in Taiwan’s capital markets. 
If the move to market deregulation is effective, we expect a reduction in herding as the market 
becomes more efficient.   
  We use the fund mean characteristics in the regressions. For example, if 10 funds buy or 
sell herd stock i in quarter t, for that stock quarter we calculate the mean fund characteristics, 
fund age size and fee charges, for these 10 funds. We then weighted those constructed measures 
by the number of stocks bought/sold. 
Insert Table 7 
The regression results are reported in Table 7. Models 1 and 2 report the results for 
directionless herding, (HM). Models 3 and 4 give the results for buy side herding (BHM) and 
models 5 and 6 show the sell side herding (SHM) results. The results for models 1 and 2 show 
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that there is a positive, significant relationship between herding and firm size, a finding 
consistent with Froot et al. (1992). The positive coefficient on BM shows that herding occurs 
more in undervalued stocks. There is also evidence of higher herding the more liquid the stock. 
We also find that herding is positively related to recent abnormal returns.  
In terms of fund characteristics, we find the herding is negatively associated with the size 
of the fund but the result is insignificant. As hypothesised we find that herding is negatively 
related to fund fees. We also find that, contrary to expectations, fund age is positively related 
to herding suggesting that as funds get older, they may herd more because of greater pressure 
from younger funds. Older funds may therefore be more concerned with reputation whereas 
younger funds are less concerned with herding as they try to gain a foothold in the sector. 
The QFII dummy is negative and significant and shows that, as hypothesised, the 
directionless herding measure was significantly lower after the regulation change implying an 
increase in market efficiency. Specifically, in model 1, the coefficient of QFII dummy is -
0.0145 (t-value = -2.09) indicates that the directionless herding measures after the QFII change 
are significantly lower by 1.45% per quarter relative to the overall mean of 11.56 (see table 2). 
A similar pattern also identified in model 2. 
As models 3 and 4 show, buy side herding is positively related to abnormal returns. We 
also find a negative relationship between buy side herding and the value of assets in a fund. 
Larger funds will be able to benefit more from greater expertise and analyst specialisation. 
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They may therefore be less inclined to herd, particularly if they possess better private 
information. The fund’s fees are also negatively related to buy side herding. This may be 
because lower fee income creates an incentive to follow the market. Finally, we find that the 
QFII coefficient is negatively but insignificantly related to buy side herding.   
Models 5 and 6 show that sell side herding is positively and significantly related to market 
value resulting in less herding in smaller stocks. We also report that stocks with lower liquidity 
experience less herding. There is also evidence that higher fees reduce sell side herding. 
Consistent with Wermers (1999) we find that sell side herding is more likely to occur in 
undervalued stocks. We also find that there is a significant and negative relationship between 
abnormal returns and sell side herding further supporting the argument that poorly performing 
stocks are sold. There is also evidence that larger funds herd more.  
Finally, we find in models 5 and 6 that the QFII coefficient is negative and significantly 
related to sell side herding. This implies there is significantly less sell side herding after the 
abolition of QFII. Specifically, in model 5, after controlling for all other variables, sell side 
herding was reduced by 2.04 per cent per quarter after QFII had been abolished. The similar 
pattern also identified in model 6, where QFII deregulation produces a negative 2.83 per cent 
change in sell side herding. This is consistent with the change improving the efficiency of the 
market in terms of sell side herding. This suggests that funds are becoming more willing to 
hold stocks when other funds are selling but that buy herding has remained unaffected by the 
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change in regulations. This implies an asymmetric reduction in information asymmetry such 
that buy side activities still exhibit herding whereas sell side activity exhibits less herding.      
V Conclusions 
 This paper has analysed the factors affecting directionless, buy and sell herding amongst 
Taiwanese mutual fund managers and finds herding behaviours among Taiwanese mutual fund 
managers. We also find buy-side herding is greater than sell-herding, which is consistent with 
Grinblatt et al. (1995).  
We find a higher level of buy-side herding in growth stocks whereas sell-side herding is 
more common in value stocks. We find that stock liquidity affects herding with more buy side 
herding in more liquid stocks and more sell side herding in less liquid stocks. We also find that 
there is more sell side herding in lower abnormal return stocks and that there is more buy side 
herding in higher abnormal return stocks.  
This study also finds that momentum trading is a common strategy that Taiwanese mutual 
fund managers utilize to pursue short-term profit and window dressing effects. This explains 
the herding behaviour of Taiwanese mutual fund managers, buying the winners and selling the 
losers. Our study confirms that the momentum trading pattern could be a factor that shapes the 
herding behaviour in the Taiwanese mutual fund industry, especially during the portfolio 
formation period. We find that buy-side herding seems to have a destabilizing effect on stock 
prices.  
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 We also find that directionless herding activity is significantly lower in the post-QFII 
period suggesting that the market is operating more efficiently after the change in regulatory 
conditions. However, we further find that while the regulatory change has had no effect on buy 
side herding it has resulted in less supply side herding. It may be that there is a difference in 
the quality of information affecting the two decisions.     
Our regression results show that the change in the regulatory framework has lead to an 
improvement in the efficiency of the market. We also find that stock characteristics such as 
size, book to market, liquidity and prior returns all affect the degree of herding. Fund 
characteristics such as fund size, fees and fund age also affect herding. Our results further show 
that different factors affect buy and sell herding which indicates that differentiating between 
the two herding directions is important.  
 In terms of further research, we have utilized quarterly data to identify the importance of 
a firm’s characteristic factors that contribute to herding behaviour in the Taiwanese mutual fund 
industry. However, as Elton et al. (2010), argue further insights into institutional investors’ 
herding behaviour may be gained by using more frequently published data. Therefore further 
research based on monthly data may offer additional insights. 
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Table 1 Fund managers’ buy and sell decisions 
 
 Year 
QFII deregulation 
period 
Whole 
period 
Pre- Post-  
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
1996-
2003 
2004-
2008 
1996-2008 
Number of 
funds 
52 65 92 110 138 147 160 166 170 174 179 190 191   
 
Buys 
4096 4340 5743 6754 8876 10799 13778 14710 14031 13187 15575 17449 17137 65511 80964 146475 
[0.50] [0.49] [0.51] [0.48] [0.51] [0.51] [0.52] [0.50] [0.49] [0.47] [0.50] [0.50] [0.51] [0.51] [0.49] [0.50] 
Sells 
4128 4541 5574 7320 8530 10418 12682 14767 14551 14916 15525 17222 16598 64087 82685 146772 
[0.50] [0.51] [0.49] [0.52] [0.49] [0.49] [0.48] [0.50] [0.51] [0.53] [0.50] [0.50] [0.49] [0.49] [0.51] [0.50] 
Total 8224 8881 11317 14074 17406 21217 26460 29477 28582 28103 31100 34671 33735 129598 163649 293247 
 
This table shows the total number of purchases, sales, and aggregate trades for each year, pre- (1996-2003) and post-QFII deregulation period (2004-2008). The brackets 
indicate the proportion of buys and sells. 
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Table 2 Mean herding measures; directionless (HM), buy ( BHM) and sell ( SHM) (%) 
 
 
 Number of funds trading in the period 
 n≧1 n≧5 n≧10 n≧5 n≧25 
HM 
8.43 11.56 11.95 12.12 12.53 
[293247] [273612] [246936] [221383] [179222] 
BHM 
8.78 12.42 0.12.68 12.86 13.05 
[146475] [137222] [123828] [111001] [89814] 
SHM 
8.10 10.73 11.25 11.40 12.00 
[146772] [136390] [123108] [110382] [89408] 
 The directionless HM are calculated as the average of HMi,t across all stock trading periods by at 
least the number of funds traded indicated in the row heading. We also report the buy-side (BHM) and 
sell-side (SHM) herding measures as HMi,t conditions on on pi,t > pt and pi,t < pt, respectively. The herding 
measures are computed in each stock-quarter and then averaged over the constituents of each group. The 
total number of stock-quarters traded in each subgroup is in parentheses.  
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Table 3 Mean herding measures by stock characteristics: size, book-to-market ratio, illiquidity, liquidity, 
and formation period returns (HM, BHM, SHM) (%) 
 
Panel A: Mean herding measures by market capitalization 
 Size  
 S1 S2 S3 S1-S3 
HM 11.56*** 11.02*** 11.46*** 0.10 
 (30.07) (29.02) (24.32) (0.16) 
BHM 12.33*** 11.84*** 11.89*** 0.44 
 (19.84) (24.19) (20.06) (0.51) 
SHM 10.33*** 10.30*** 10.83*** -0.50 
 (20.33) (21.97) (19.65) (-0.67) 
Mean Size (NT$bils) 4.17 13.72 130.36  
Median Size (NT$bils) 3.74 12.01 66.76  
Panel B: Mean herding measures by book-to-market ratio 
 Book-to-market ratio  
 BM1 BM2 BM3 BM3-BM1 
HM 10.95*** 10.84*** 12.30*** 1.35** 
 (33.87) (26.44) (25.95) (2.35) 
BHM 12.97*** 11.68*** 11.17*** -1.80** 
 (27.24) (23.19) (15.24) (-2.05) 
SHM 8.21*** 10.11*** 12.48*** 4.28*** 
 (19.14) (21.59) (24.27) (6.39) 
Mean BM 0.24 0.46 0.87  
Median BM 0.23 0.45 0.79  
Panel C: Mean herding measures by ILLIQ 
 ILLIQ  
 ILLIQ1 ILLIQ2 ILLIQ3 ILLIQ3-ILLIQ1 
HM 11.07*** 10.79*** 10.77*** -0.30 
 (22.30) (22.71) (19.81) (-0.40) 
BHM 9.67*** 11.17*** 11.21*** 1.54 
 (17.35) (17.92) (14.06) (1.59) 
SHM 12.22*** 10.48*** 9.58*** -2.64*** 
 (18.50) (18.84) (14.25) (-2.80) 
Mean Trading Value (NT$bils) 20.73 4.94 1.74  
Median Trading Value (NT$bils) 12.59 3.22 1.02  
Panel D: Mean herding measures by STURN 
 STURN  
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 STURN1 STURN2 STURN3 ST3-ST1 
HM 9.15*** 11.10*** 12.28*** 3.13*** 
 (17.95) (26.29) (25.68) (4.48) 
BHM 8.47*** 10.94*** 12.70*** 4.22*** 
 (12.17) (17.67) (19.46) (4.43) 
SHM 8.80*** 11.30*** 11.69*** 2.89*** 
 (12.48) (20.34) (19.42) (3.12) 
Mean Turnover (%) 9.58 25.85 56.26  
Median Turnover (%) 6.98 19.80 46.48  
Panel E: Mean herding measures by raw returns 
 Returns  
 RET1 RET2 RET3 RET3-RET1 
HM 13.62*** 6.46*** 13.95*** 0.33 
 (30.01) (24.33) (25.49) (0.46) 
BHM 2.12*** 6.44*** 16.32*** 14.20*** 
 (3.33) (19.11) (29.37) (16.83) 
SHM 15.54*** 6.40*** 2.17*** -13.37*** 
 (33.59) (17.34) (4.16) (-19.15) 
Mean Return -0.0572 0.0078 0.1176  
Median Return -0.0486 0.0097 0.0937  
The values of HM are calculated for all subgroups separately as the average of HMi,t across all stock-
periods traded by at least five funds. Also presented are buying herding measure (BHM) and selling 
herding measure (SHM), which are values of HMi,t conditional on pi,t > pt and pi,t < pt, respectively. Panel 
A presents mean values of HM, BHM, and SHM segregated by market capitalization, which the smallest 
30% stocks are assigned to S1, the largest 30% are assigned to S3, while the middle 40% are in S2. 
Similarly, Panel B presents mean values of HM, BHM, and SHM segregated by book-to-market ratio. 
Panel C presents mean values of HM, BHM, and SHM segregated by illiquidity factor as Amihud (2002) 
defined. Panel D presents mean values of HM, BHM, and SHM segregated by liquidity factor, which 
measured as the natural logarithm of the average of share turnover over the prior 3 months. Panel E 
presents mean values of HM, BHM, and SHM segregated by three-month formation period return. The 
herding measures are computed in each stock-quarter and then averaged over the constituents of each 
group. t-statistics are shown in parentheses.  
***, significant at 1%  ** significant at 5% * significant at 10% 
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Table 4 Prior and post returns of institutional herding portfolios 
 
Panel A  
Full sample period 
 Formation period  
1996 - 2008 Q-3 Q-2 Q-1 Q0 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
P1 Intense Buy 0.0403*** 0.0464*** 0.0621*** 0.0982*** 0.0072 0.0124* 0.0099* 0.0082* 
 (6.71) (6.87) (6.83) (7.20) (0.84) (1.80) (1.91) (1.73) 
P2 Light Buy 0.0384*** 0.0389*** 0.0390*** 0.0386*** 0.0125 0.0115* 0.0090* 0.0081* 
 (5.73) (5.55) (4.82) (3.67) (1.40) (1.88) (1.90) (1.94) 
P3 Light Sell 0.0270*** 0.0244*** 0.0190*** 0.0004 0.0100 0.0094 0.0058 0.0059 
 (5.26) (4.75) (2.73) (0.05) (1.13) (1.47) (1.35) (1.52) 
P4 Intense Sell 0.0151*** 0.0086* -0.0022 -0.0370*** 0.0093 0.0069 0.0038 0.0040 
 (3.30) (1.89) (-0.38) (-5.02) (0.89) (1.03) (0.83) (1.01) 
Intense Sell – Light Sell -0.0119* -0.0158** -0.0211** -0.0374*** -0.0007 -0.0025 -0.0021 -0.0019 
P4-P3 (-1.74) (-2.30) (-2.35) (-3.29) (-0.05) (-0.27) (-0.33) (-0.34) 
Intense Buy – Light Buy 0.0019 0.0075 0.0231* 0.0596*** -0.0054 0.0009 0.0009 0.001 
P1-P2 (0.21) (0.77) (1.90) (3.46) (-0.43) (0.10) (0.13) (0.01) 
Intense Buy – Intense Sell 0.0253*** 0.0378*** 0.0643*** 0.1352*** -0.0022 0.0054 0.0062 0.0041 
P1-P4 (3.35) (4.64) (5.99) (8.72) (-0.16) (0.57) (0.90) (0.67) 
    
Panel B 
Sub-period 
 Formation period  
1996 -2002 
Pre QFII 
Q-3 Q-2 Q-1 Q0 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
P1 Intense Buy 0.0403*** 0.0459*** 0.0672*** 0.1069*** 0.0075 0.0119* 0.0102** 0.0080* 
 (6.93) (7.07) (7.35) (7.69) (0.78) (1.78) (2.04) (1.79) 
P2 Light Buy 0.0396*** 0.0424*** 0.0439*** 0.0448*** 0.0138 0.0106* 0.0082* 0.0077* 
 (5.91) (5.91) (5.32) (4.22) (1.51) (1.85) (1.77) (1.90) 
P3 Light Sell 0.0251*** 0.0239*** 0.0210*** 0.0017 0.0127 0.0092 0.0063 0.0061 
 (4.96) (4.87) (3.15) (0.20) (1.39) (1.48) (1.49) (1.66) 
P4 Intense Sell 0.0123*** 0.0055 -0.0041 -0.0382*** 0.0118 0.0075 0.0031 0.0042 
 (2.95) (1.36) (-0.79) (-5.25) (1.14) (1.21) (0.81) (1.17) 
Intense Buy – Intense Sell 0.0280*** 0.0404*** 0.0713*** 0.1450*** -0.0043 0.0044 0.0071 0.0037 
P1-P4 (3.91) (5.28) (6.80) (9.25) (-0.31) (0.48) (1.12) (0.66) 
    
Panel C 
Sub-period 
 Formation period  
2004 – 2008 Q-3 Q-2 Q-1 Q0 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
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Post QFII 
P1 Intense Buy 0.0412*** 0.0447*** 0.0499*** 0.0773*** -0.0001 0.0078 0.0062 0.0056 
 (8.15) (7.84) (8.09) (9.74) (-0.02) (1.43) (1.36) (1.34) 
P2 Light Buy 0.0367*** 0.0335*** 0.0287*** 0.0253*** 0.0042 0.0088 0.0074* 0.0069* 
 (7.39) (6.09) (5.07) (4.09) (0.67) (1.63) (1.73) (1.74) 
P3 Light Sell 0.0288*** 0.0215*** 0.0116** -0.0069 0.0027 0.0076 0.0039 0.0052 
 (6.96) (4.90) (2.32) (-1.20) (0.47) (1.34) (0.98) (1.37) 
P4 Intense Sell 0.0194*** 0.0107** -0.0020 -0.0370*** 0.0004 0.0031 0.0011 0.0018 
 (4.52) (2.43) (-0.40) (-6.77) (0.07) (0.55) (0.25) (0.49) 
Intense Buy – Intense Sell 0.0218*** 0.0340*** 0.0519*** 0.1142*** -0.0006 0.0048 0.0052 0.0039 
P1-P4 (3.28) (4.72) (6.61) (11.86) (-0.06) (0.61) (0.83) (0.69) 
 
. The intense buy portfolio is the group with the most institutional buying. The intense sell portfolio is 
the group with the most institutional selling. The light buy portfolio is the group with the least 
institutional buying. The light sell portfolio is the group with the least institutional selling. P1 minus P4 
represents a zero-investment portfolio, which is long in intense buy-herding portfolio (P1) and short in 
intense sell-herding portfolio (P4). t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  
*** significant at 1%  ** significant at 5% * significant at 10% 
 
 
 
  
Panel D 
Mean difference between 
 
Formation 
period 
 
Pre QFII v Post QFII Q-3 Q-2 Q-1 Q0 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
P1 -0.0009 0.0011 0.0173 0.0296*** 0.0076 0.0040 0.0040 0.0023 
Intense Buy (-1.24) (1.45) (17.16) (20.26) (7.22) (5.11) (6.28) (3.94) 
P2 0.0030 0.0089 0.0152 0.0195*** 0.0097 0.0019 0.0008 0.0008 
Light Buy (3.92) (10.75) (16.59 (17.37) (9.56) (2.62) (1.34) (1.41) 
P3 -0.0037 0.0024 0.0095 0.0086*** 0.0100 0.0015 0.0024 0.0009 
Light Sell (-6.22) (3.97) (12.47 (9.36) (10.10)  (1.99) (4.34) (1.82) 
P4 -0.0071 -0.0052 -0.0021 -0.0012 0.0114 0.0045 0.0021 0.0024 
Intense Sell (-12.97) (-9.52) (-3.27) (-1.45) (10.24) (5.88) (3.85) (4.95) 
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Table 5 Descriptive statistics 
 
   Percentile 
 Mean Stdev. 25 50 75 
Panel A: Summary statistics for fund 
characteristics 
 
TNAV (NT$ mils) 2081.42 1339.97 1238.06 1725.50 2559.25 
FEE (%) 0.14 0.01 0.14 0.14 0.15 
AGE (year) 7.19 2.78 5.00 7.00 9.20 
Panel B: Summary statistics for stock characteristics 
SIZE (NT$ mils) 45757.64 116120.73 5475.50 12054.50 35470.75
BM 0.52 0.33 0.29 0.44 0.66 
Vol (mils) 3.15 3.76 1.00 2.00 4.00 
Turnover 0.29 0.29 0.09 0.19 0.39 
ILLIQ 0.05 0.14 0.01 0.02 0.04 
STURN 3.00 0.93 2.36 3.06 3.71 
RET 2_3 0.03 0.02 -0.09 0.02 0.15 
Panel C: Summary statistics for Fund managers’ buy and sell decisions 
Buy 11.61 13.76 3.00 7.00 14.00 
Sell 11.54 13.96 3.00 7.00 14.00 
 
Panel A reports average total net assets value (TNAV) of all funds in the database, fee 
charges, FEE and fund age, AGE. Panel B provides summary statistics of stock 
characteristics, average market capitalization, SIZE, book-to-market ratio, BM, and 
trading volume, VOL, share turnover, Turnover, the liquidity measure of Amihud 
(2002) which takes the absolute value of returns, scaled by dollar volume, ILLIQ, the 
natural logarithm of the average of share turnover over the prior 3 months, STURN, 
the cumulative return over the second through the third months prior to the current 
month, RET2_3. Panel C provides summary statistics of the total number of fund 
managers’ buy and sell decisions. Data are from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ).
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Table 6 Mean differences between the pre- and post-QFII deregulation period 
 
 1996-2003 
P1 
2004-2008 
P2 
Diff. in means 
P2 minus P1 
Panel A: Summary statistics for fund characteristics 
SIZE (NT$ mils) 
2488.09 1838.18 -649.91 
(13.26)*** (13.71)*** (-2.56)*** 
FEE (%) 
0.14 0.15 -0.01 
(88.02)*** (81.30) (-0.38) 
AGE (year) 
5.07 9.02 3.95 
(31.23)*** (35.84)*** (13.84)*** 
Panel B: Summary statistics for stock characteristics 
SIZE (NT$ mils) 
42756.36 49835.08 7078.72 
(19.88)*** (34.99)*** (2.46)** 
BM 
0.46 0.54 0.08 
(18.15)*** (17.17)*** (2.02)** 
VOL 
2.99 3.15 0.16 
(18.36)*** (14.51)*** (0.60) 
Turnover 
0.31 0.28 -0.03 
(14.72)*** (15.83)*** (-1.24) 
ILLIQ 
0.05 0.04 -0.01 
(6.26)*** (8.54) ** (-0.56) 
STURN 
3.17 2.89 -0.27 
(59.70)*** (52.61)*** (-3.41)*** 
RET2_3 
0.05 0.02 -0.03 
(1.57) (0.65) (-0.61) 
Panel C: Summary statistics for Fund managers’ buy and sell decisions 
Buy 
10.13 12.57 2.44 
(19.49)*** (34.34)*** (3.48)*** 
Sell 
9.89 12.78 2.88 
(20.77)*** (43.70)*** (4.59)*** 
 
t-statistics are shown in parentheses.*** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; * 
significant at 10% 
 
Variables defined Table 5
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Table 7 Determinants of the mutual fund herding: fixed effects regressions 
 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Directionless 
Herding 
Buy-side Herding Sell-side Herding 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
SIZE 
0.0159 0.0157 0.0115 0.0136 0.0251 0.0216 
(1.87) * (1.80) * (0.87) (1.03) (2.27) ** (1.98) ** 
BM 
0.0264 0.0239 0.0148 0.0172 0.0422 0.0332 
(2.73) *** (2.44) ** (0.94) (1.12) (3.09) *** (2.49) ** 
ILLIQ 
 0.0096  0.0303  -0.0251 
 (0.54)  (0.60)  (-1.12) 
STURN 
0.0072  -0.0045  0.0211  
(1.81) *  (-0.71)  (3.92) ***  
RET2_3 
0.0004 0.0004 0.0011 0.0011 -0.0006 -0.0004 
(3.88) *** (4.62) *** (7.64) *** (7.81) *** (-4.11) *** 
(-3.19) 
*** 
QFII 
-0.0145 -0.0169 -0.0089 -0.0072 -0.0204 -0.0283 
(-2.09) ** (-2.50) ** (-0.89) (-0.74) (-2.13) ** 
(-2.99) 
*** 
TNAV 
-0.0046 -0.0044 -0.0219 -0.0219 0.0107 0.0115 
(-1.11) (-1.05) 
(-2.75) 
*** 
(-2.75) 
*** 
(1.86) * (1.98) ** 
FEE 
-0.2159 -0.2156 -0.6534 -0.6428 0.1369 0.1392 
(-2.36) ** (-2.35) ** 
(-4.44) 
*** 
(-4.42) 
*** 
(0.99) (1.00) 
AGE 
0.0022 0.0023 0.0044 0.0044 0.0011 0.0013 
(2.07) ** (2.10) ** (2.45) ** (2.42) ** (0.79) (0.93) 
Constant 
0.0083 0.0299 0.2513 0.2148 -0.2721 -0.1821 
(0.10) (0.37) (1.95) * (1.75) * 
(-2.66) 
*** 
(-1.84) * 
R-squared 0.0080 0.0074 0.0421 0.0423 0.0282 0.0221 
Number of 
observations 
5381 5381 2648 2648 2733 2733 
 
SIZE is the nature logarithm of the market value of equity at time t, BM, is the book to 
market value of the equity at time t, ILLIQ, the liquidity measure of Amihud (2002) 
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which takes the absolute value of returns, scaled by dollar volume, STURN, the natural 
logarithm of the average of share turnover over the prior 3 months, RET2_3 the 
cumulative return over the second through the third months prior to the current month. 
QFII is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 after the regulation change in 2003 and 
0 in the pre 2003 period. TNAV is the nature logarithm of fund total net asset value at 
time t, FEE is the fund management fee charges at time t. AGE is fund age in time t. 
All standard errors are adjusted by clustering by stock. t-statistics are shown in 
parentheses.*** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
 
 
 
